Chaos at New York’s Major Airports

Over the past seven months, the three major airports serving New York City have seen a rise in serious incidents and accidents. During that time, six major events occurred, including one fatal accident and several near misses on the ground and in the air. Errors by pilots and air traffic controllers suggest an air transportation system under significant strain.
Each year, more than 1.1 million flights operate in the New York City metroplex, making it one of the busiest and most demanding airspaces in the world. Air traffic services for JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark are provided by professional air traffic controllers who often work short-staffed and with aging equipment. Some facilities operate with only 60 percent of their authorized controller workforce, forcing many controllers to work overtime, including 10-hour days up to six days a week.
Most of these incidents involved a loss of separation on the ground, such as runway incursions, or in the air, such as near midair collisions, between aircraft. The industry has worked to reduce these events since they spiked in 2024.
FAA data show that nationwide runway incursions fell 7 percent from FY2024 to FY2025, decreasing from 1,758 events to 1,636, the most recent full-year figures available. In the first six months of FY2026 and FY2025, however, the totals were essentially unchanged at 734 and 735 events, respectively.
The most recent high-profile events included a fatal runway collision between a regional jet and fire truck and a Boeing 767 striking a semitruck on the New Jersey Turnpike.
Regional jet hits a fire truck
On March 22, 2026, an Air Canada CRJ-900 (operated by Jazz Aviation) was substantially damaged after it collided with an aircraft rescue firefighting (ARFF) vehicle, while landing on runway 4 at LaGuardia Airport (LGA) in New York. The captain and first officer were killed. “Jazz Flight 646” was a scheduled flight from Montreal-Trudeau International Airport (YUL), Montreal, Quebec, to LGA; 72 passengers and two flight attendants were onboard. A total of 39 were transported to local hospitals, including six with serious injuries. This crash was the first fatal commercial aircraft accident at LGA in three decades.
Just prior to the accident, the scene at LGA was “busy.” In addition to the normal flow of departures and arrivals, a United Airlines flight had rejected two takeoff attempts, reported smoke in the cabin, declared an emergency and was planning to evacuate the aircraft. This event was a distraction and significantly increased the workload of the ATC controllers on duty.
At the time of the accident, according to NTSB reports, there were two ATC controllers on duty in the tower. This level of ATC staffing is consistent with a “mid-shift basic watch,” as the operational tempo decreases in the late evening hours. Both ATC controllers were qualified, current and highly experienced and were on duty for less than one hour. The local (tower) controller had 18 years of experience, while the ground controller had 19 years of experience.
According to the NTSB preliminary report, the ARFF vehicle (radio callsign “Truck One”) involved in the accident was responding to the United flight that had declared an emergency on the east side of the airport. “Truck One” was leading a convoy of six ARFF and Port Authority vehicles to assist the aircraft in distress. To reach it, the convoy had to cross runway 4 at taxiway D, about one-third of the way down from the runway threshold.
At 23:36:56 local time, “Truck One and company” requested a clearance to cross runway 4 at taxiway D, and the ATC tower controller instructed them to cross the runway. The accident aircraft, at that time, was 130 feet above the ground on a ¼ mile final approach – roughly two minutes prior, the same controller had cleared Jazz Flight 646 to land on runway 4.
At 23:37:07, Truck One read back the clearance and began to move towards the runway, the CRJ was now only 87 feet above the runway. Five seconds later, the tower controller instructed Truck One to “stop.” There was no acknowledgement from the truck. Nearly simultaneously, the aircraft touched down at 128 knots and Truck One entered the runway. At this point, the aircraft and truck were only 1,450 feet apart. ATC again instructed Truck One to “stop, stop, stop.” Only then did the operator of Truck One realize the instructions were for them and then saw the lights of the aircraft.
According to NTSB flight data analysis, just prior to impact “the airplane’s braking action began and thrust reversers were deployed.” The last recorded parameters indicated a rudder deflection to the left of six degrees and a ground speed of 90 knots. Truck One turned to the left just prior to the collision.
“I messed up…”
After the crash, LiveATC.net captured a conversation between the ATC tower controller and the crew of a Frontier Airlines flight. The Frontier pilots queried about expected delays and commented on the accident, and the controller responded, “Yeah, I know I was here, I tried to reach out to ‘em I stopped and we were dealing with an emergency earlier and I messed up.”
NTSB investigators found the airport was equipped with Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X) and a runway status light system. ASDE-X displays vehicles and aircraft on the ground in real-time, and alerts ATC controllers if there is a potential conflict. This system depends on a radar system and transponders (either aircraft or vehicles) to generate alerts. The ARFF vehicle involved in the crash was not equipped with a transponder, thus no alerts were issued to the controllers.
In addition, the runway entrance lights (REL) at the intersection of taxiway D and runway 4 were operational. These red lights are part of the runway status light system that is activated by the ASDE-X system and illuminates when an aircraft takes off or lands on a runway. Prior to the crash, the RELs were illuminated, yet Truck One did not stop.
The NTSB final accident report is expected to be released in the next 12 months. It will likely focus on ATC controller workload pressures and technologies to prevent further runway incursions.
Boeing 767 hits a bakery truck
On May 3, 2026, a United Airlines Boeing 767-400ER approaching Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR) struck a light pole and an 18-wheel semitruck on the New Jersey Turnpike. This event occurred less than three months after the deadly runway incursion at LGA. Fortunately, the truck driver survived the accident with only minor injuries. No injuries were reported among the 231 passengers and crew onboard the United jet.
Following the incident, United Airlines made the following statement: “Upon its final approach into Newark International Airport, United flight 169 came into contact with a light pole. The aircraft landed safely, taxied to the gate normally and no passengers or crew were injured. Our maintenance team is evaluating damage to the aircraft. We will conduct a rigorous flight safety investigation into the incident, and our crew has been removed from service as part of the process.”
Due to strong winds, the aircraft was flying an RNAV (RNAV GPS W Rwy 29) approach to runway 29; this runway is significantly shorter than the other runways at EWR. The approach path is designed to cross the threshold of the runway at 60 feet above the ground. The accident flight was much lower during the final segment of the approach, since the main landing gear struck the cab of the Schmidt Bakery truck at 139 knots.
The RNAV W runway 29 approach is challenging. It has LNAV only minimums (vs. LNAV/VNAV) that, depending on the aircraft type, may not provide vertical guidance to the runway from its minimum descent altitude (MDA). Below the MDA, this is a visual maneuver using the vertical glide slope indicator (VGSI or PAPI). In addition, there is an important note (34:1 is not clear) in the profile view of the approach chart. According to the FAA, “When the chart note says ’34:1 not clear’, it means that obstacles penetrate this slope in the visual segment below the MDA.” In other words, the published MDA and glidepath do not guarantee obstacle clearance all the way to the runway.
Another often overlooked factor is an aircraft’s eye-to-wheel height (EWH), the vertical distance between the pilot’s eyes and the aircraft’s lowest point in the landing attitude (typically the main landing gear). Understanding EWH helps flight crews determine whether a visual glide slope indicator (VGSI) is suitable for the aircraft they are flying. EWH varies by aircraft type, from less than four feet in a light business jet to about 45 feet in a Boeing 747.
The NTSB has classified the EWR event as an accident due to the monetary amount of damage to the aircraft. Investigators have downloaded information from the cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders. NTSB preliminary reports are typically published within 30 days of the accident.
Regional Jet hits Regional Jet
Each incident described above was serious, including the fatal runway incursion at LaGuardia. Several others also could have turned catastrophic and resulted in a much greater loss of life.
On October 1, 2025, two CRJ-900s collided on a taxiway at New York’s LaGuardia airport. Both aircraft were operated by Endeavor Airlines on behalf of Delta Air Lines. One flight attendant received minor injuries. Both aircraft were substantially damaged.
NTSB reports that one of the aircraft (a flight from Charlotte, NC) had just landed on runway 4 at LGA and was instructed to taxi to the gate, a route which crossed taxiway A. The other aircraft (a flight to Roanoke, Virginia) was instructed by ATC to hold short of taxiway A. The NTSB determined that the pilots of the outbound flight failed to hold short of that taxiway, as instructed by ATC, and collided with the arriving aircraft as it cleared the runway.
Close call at EWR
On March 17, 2026, there was a serious close call at Newark Liberty International Airport involving a FedEx Boeing 777 cargo jet and an Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 passenger jet. This event further highlights the complexities of managing high-volume traffic in congested airspace near New York City. The incident occurred when the aircraft were on approach to intersecting runways.
NTSB described the event as a “close call,” with the Alaska Airlines 737 overflying the FedEx 777 as it was on its final approach to landing. According to the FAA, which is also investigating the incident, an ATC controller issued go-around instructions to the Boeing 737, since the Boeing 777 had already been cleared to land on an intersecting runway.
According to reports, the go-around instructions were issued at a low altitude – approximately 300-325 feet above ground, causing the Alaska airplane to climb directly over the FedEx plane as it continued its approach and landing. Radar data indicate there was minimal vertical separation between the two aircraft.
Near miss at JFK
About five weeks after the near midair collision at EWR, two Embraer E175 aircraft came dangerously close during parallel approaches at JFK. During this event on April 20, a Republic Airways E175 (operating for American Airlines) was assigned runway 31L, while a Jazz Aviation E175 (operating for Air Canada) was assigned runway 31R.
During the approach, the Republic Airways’ E175 deviated from its assigned approach path, descending below the prescribed altitude and drifting into the adjacent approach corridor.
The aircraft closed within 0.6 nautical miles of each other and both aircraft received Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) resolution advisories, which triggered urgent evasive action for the pilots. Both aircraft followed the TCAS commands and executed a go-around. There were no reported injuries. The FAA is formally investigating the event as a “loss-of-separation” incident.
Another near miss
On May 4, 2026, an Endeavor Air CRJ-900 operating on behalf of Delta Air Lines experienced a close call with a Cirrus SR22 aircraft while approaching JFK airport. The CRJ pilot reported a TCAS traffic advisory event (awareness) that escalated to a resolution advisory event (evasive action). The resolution advisory commanded the CRJ crew to maintain its altitude as the Cirrus passed within 500 feet vertically of the airliner. Preliminary ADS-B data suggests the aircraft passed within 475 feet vertically of each other.
The perfect storm and an ATC meltdown
These events reflect challenges that have been building for years in the national airspace system, including aging infrastructure, ATC controller shortages, and airline pressure to increase flights at hubs already operating at capacity.
In May 2025, before these events unfolded, Newark experienced a major ATC meltdown that caused a 90-second loss of radar and communications for controllers handling arrivals and departures. The terminal radar approach control (TRACON) facility that served EWR lost the ability to “see and talk” to aircraft for over 90 seconds. Newark experienced at least three similar equipment failures during a two-week period. During these events, ATC controllers were literally operating in the blind.
For ATC controllers, these were traumatic events – union officials praised them for “saving the day,” but many controllers took “trauma leave” to cope with the stresses building up to the event.
The radar and communications outage was linked to a failed copper wire in a decades-old telecommunications line that transmits data and audio to controllers. This points to a strained system with out-of-date equipment.
Air traffic controller staffing, training, and retention affect the entire national airspace system. FAA sources point to a significant shortfall: about 11,000 controllers are currently on duty nationwide, compared with a target of 12,500 to 14,000. Repeated government shutdowns also cost the FAA roughly two years of training capacity at its academy in Oklahoma City.
FAA Response
The FAA has taken steps to address the shortage, including a plan to hire and train 8,500 additional controllers by 2028. Even so, critics of the plan note that staffing problems will likely persist throughout the decade as retirements and attrition continue to outpace any gains.
In addition, the FAA plans on replacing aging infrastructure with digital systems, expanding simulator-based training and employing artificial intelligence to optimize air traffic management.